72 ideas
| 13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
| 13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
| 14600 | Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J] |
| 13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
| 14603 | 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J] |
| 14607 | T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J] |
| 10373 | Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J] |
| 13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
| 14604 | If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J] |
| 13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
| 17306 | If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J] |
| 17304 | As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J] |
| 14599 | Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J] |
| 13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
| 13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
| 10367 | There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J] |
| 13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
| 14605 | Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J] |
| 14601 | Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J] |
| 14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
| 13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
| 13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
| 14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
| 14606 | Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J] |
| 13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
| 13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
| 17308 | Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J] |
| 22858 | There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes] |
| 7346 | Jeremiah implied a link between weakness and goodness, and the evil of the state [Jeremiah, by Johnson,P] |
| 22854 | Power is a capacity, which may never need to be exercised [Lukes] |
| 22850 | Hidden powers are the most effective [Lukes] |
| 22852 | The pluralist view says that power is restrained by group rivalry [Lukes] |
| 22855 | One-dimensionsal power is behaviour in observable conflicts of interests [Lukes] |
| 22856 | Political organisation brings some conflicts to the fore, and suppresses others [Lukes] |
| 22857 | The two-dimensional view of power recognises the importance of controlling the agenda [Lukes] |
| 22859 | Power can be exercised to determine a person's desires [Lukes] |
| 22863 | Power is the capacity of a social class to realise its interests [Lukes] |
| 22860 | The evidence for the exertion of power need not involve a grievance of the powerless [Lukes] |
| 22861 | Power is affecting a person in a way contrary to their interests [Lukes] |
| 21133 | Supreme power is getting people to have thoughts and desires chosen by you [Lukes] |
| 22851 | In the 1950s they said ideology is finished, and expertise takes over [Lukes] |
| 22862 | Liberals take people as they are, and take their preferences to be their interests [Lukes] |
| 22853 | Anyone who thinks capitalism can improve their lives is endorsing capitalism [Lukes] |
| 17305 | I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J] |
| 10359 | In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J] |
| 10372 | Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J] |
| 10374 | There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J] |
| 17307 | Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J] |
| 10366 | Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J] |
| 10377 | Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J] |
| 10378 | A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J] |
| 10382 | Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 10375 | At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J] |
| 10389 | Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J] |
| 10390 | Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J] |
| 10380 | Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J] |
| 10385 | If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 10388 | Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J] |
| 10387 | The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J] |
| 10384 | If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 10386 | If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J] |
| 10361 | Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J] |
| 10360 | Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J] |
| 10362 | One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J] |
| 10368 | If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J] |
| 10383 | The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J] |
| 10393 | Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J] |
| 10394 | Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J] |
| 10376 | The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J] |
| 10381 | All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 22920 | Do I not fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord [Jeremiah] |
| 22089 | Am I a God afar off, and not a God close at hand? [Jeremiah] |